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Based on studies in affective neuroscience and evolutionary psychiatry, a tentative new
proposal is made here as to the nature and identification of primordial emotional systems.
Our model stresses phylogenetic origins of emotional systems, which we believe is nec-
essary for a full understanding of the functions of emotions and additionally suggests that
emotional organizing systems play a role in sculpting the brain during ontogeny. Nascent
emotional systems thus affect cognitive development. A second proposal concerns two
additions to the affective systems identified by Panksepp. We suggest there is substantial
evidence for a primary emotional organizing program dealing with power, rank, dominance,
and subordination which instantiates competitive and territorial behavior and is an evolu-
tionary contributor to self-esteem in humans. A program underlying disgust reactions which
originally functioned in ancient vertebrates to protect against infection and toxins is also
suggested.
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INTRODUCTION
Cognitive development of individuals, we have suggested in a
previous paper, proceeds in part due to influences of primary
emotional operating systems which act collectively as fitness cri-
teria guiding further neuronal development (Ellis and Toronchuk,
2005). Specifically we suggested that Panksepp’s (1998, 2001) for-
mulation of affective neuroscience can be seen as a complement
to the theory of neural Darwinism as proposed by Edelman (1989,
1992). Important aspects of neural development could be expli-
cated by linking the relevant concepts proposed by Edelman and
Panksepp. Although we used the term Affective Neuronal Dar-
winism in previous papers, we will now adopt the term Affective
Neuronal Selection in light of recent critique of Edelman’s theory
as being selectionist, but not truly Darwinian (Fernando et al.,
2012). Our hypothesis provides a possible extension of the role of
Hebbian connectionism in guiding brain development, and it also
integrates neuroanatomy with evolutionary psychiatry and ethol-
ogy. Neural plasticity in this model would be guided by a process
of selection of the most effective pathways based on the valences
provided by primary emotional systems. Although the notion of
valence (usually as approach/avoidance or pleasure/pain) is com-
mon in theories of emotion, we use the term as referencing reward
and punishment, which most likely reflect internal states or mark-
ers (see discussions in Prinz, 2004, 2010; Rolls, 2005). In this way
primordial emotions would provide at least some of the under-
lying processes for acquisition of cognitive processes as well as
certain psychopathologies.
Our proposal contributes to the historical debate on the inter-
dependence of cognition and emotion (Zajonc, 1980; Lazarus,
1984) by examining the role of primordial emotion-related
processes in the development of cognition. Cognition and emo-
tion are now recognized as exerting mutual influence with such
entanglement that the divide between the two seems at times
artificial (Ray and Zald, 2012). The role of non-conscious emo-
tional processing and resulting biasing of cognitive processes has
thus become a major focus, in addition to the more traditional
concept of cognitive control of emotional regulation. The heuris-
tic principles in affective science, therefore, involve ontogeny and
phylogenetic continuity (Tamietto and de Gelder, 2010; de Gelder
et al., 2011).
Neurotrophins, such as brain derived neurotrophic factor
(BDNF), and monoamines such as serotonin, play critical roles
in neural selection by promoting neural plasticity, activity depen-
dent refinement of neural networks, and selection of simul-
taneously active neurons for survival (e.g., Lauder, 1993; Poo,
2001; Hua and Smith, 2004). Early activity in emotional cir-
cuits may thereby influence the wiring of later developing brain
areas. Under adverse conditions, however, complex interactions
between neurotrophins, monoamines, cytokines, and environ-
mental influences may result in psychiatric or neurodegenerative
disorders (reviewed in Castrén, 2005; Duman and Monteggia,
2006; Goodyer, 2008; Dinan, 2009). For example dopamine knock-
out mice have reduced BDNF in the frontal cortex which may lead
to reduced plasticity (Fumagalli et al., 2003). Serotonin, perhaps
the earliest transmitter present in embryos, plays several critical
roles during neural development which leave permanent effects
(reviewed in Whitiker-Azmitia, 2001). Because BDNF (Gordon
et al., 2003), and nerve growth factor (Alfonso et al., 2004) can be
modulated by activations of emotional systems, the wiring of brain
circuitry may be widely influenced by activation in emotional
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circuits during early life. The immune system is also implicated in
development, plasticity and behavioral disorders (e.g., Bauer et al.,
2007; Müller and Schwarz, 2007; Bilboa et al., 2008; Baharnoori
et al., 2009; Kemeny, 2009; McAfoose and Baune, 2009; Miller,
2009). Prenatal stress causing endocrine and immune changes in
neurotransmitter systems can alter the developmental course of
the brain increasing the risk of various disorders (e.g., Ansorge
et al., 2007). Early childhood trauma has similar effects (Nemeroff
et al., 2006; Goodyer, 2008). Both prenatal and postnatal activation
of the monoamine, endocrine, and immune systems may thereby
alter brain plasticity, and although this may occur initially at lower
brainstem levels, ultimately the developmental course of cortical
areas may be altered.
Thus primary emotional systems, influenced by endocrine
and immune functions, mediate the core nature of the selec-
tion criteria guiding the refinement of synaptic connections to
provide the emotional palette that guides individual brain devel-
opment (Ellis and Toronchuk, 2005). This mechanism ultimately
influences learning, cognitive, and social development. It fol-
lows that elucidation of the specific nature of these systems
may shed light on the way the brain functions and structures
itself.
Panksepp has described seven “primitive emotional operat-
ing systems that exist in limbic and reptilian areas of the brain”
(Panksepp, 1998, p. 52). These hierarchically organized exec-
utive operating systems give rise to specific valenced affective
states which guide flexible behavior while interacting with sev-
eral layers of non-specific perceptual, attentional, and cognitive
processes. Panksepp stresses that primary emotions, in contrast to
secondary (discussed below), include instantiation in the phylo-
genetically ancient medial and ventral brainstem pathways rich in
visceral innervation which utilize a variety of visceral neuropep-
tides (Panksepp, 1998, 2003a). While concurring with Panksepp,
we propose that these primeval valenced systems should not
only be capable of altering evolutionary survival rates of organ-
isms, but be effective at the developmental level in determin-
ing which synapses survive in individual brains in accord with
Edelman’s neural Darwinism. We propose an integrative perspec-
tive emphasizing both individual ontogeny and a broad evolu-
tionary narrative for identification of primary systems with a
resulting proposal for a more complete set of primary emotional
systems.
Our list of primordial emotional operating systems takes into
account previous proposals by authors from Darwin onward
(e.g., Ekman, 1972; Izard, 1992; Damasio, 1999), but is based
primarily on the comprehensive studies of Panksepp. Although
Ekman (1992) and others also invoke evolution, most cri-
teria for basic emotions have emphasized human facial or
semantic features and have assumed primarily a communica-
tive role for emotions (see Sabini and Silver, 2005, for a cri-
tique of Ekman’s criteria). Such approaches begin with human
subjective experience and then search for ad hoc supporting
data from other mammals rather than starting with a frame-
work informed by vertebrate evolution. The type of phyloge-
netic approach to emotions described by Lawrence and Calder
(2004) is necessary, but should extend beyond the mammalian
order.
BASIC INSIGHTS FROM EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHIATRY
Two key issues emerge from discussions in evolutionary psychiatry
(Price, 1967; Stevens and Price, 2002; also, e.g., Gilbert and Allan,
1998; Price et al., 2007).
1. Evolutionary pressures led to the development of various psy-
chological traits that are experienced by us as emotions. These
give rise to behavior patterns which originally enhanced sur-
vival. For example the need for reproductive effectiveness
results in emotional states of desire and bonding that promote
propagation of genes. This is a clear statement of the causal effi-
cacy of emotional systems in terms of affecting the evolutionary
process.
2. Many psychiatric disorders result from malfunctioning of these
evolutionary adaptive mechanisms; hence the nature of such dis-
orders is evidence of the nature of the underlying emotional mech-
anisms. This means we can attempt to relate basic emotional
systems to specific evolutionary adaptations using psychiatric
data as supportive evidence.
Stevens and Price (2002) emphasize the pathologies that result
from failures in the attachment and rank systems. These arche-
typal systems can “function healthily when evoked in appropriate
circumstances, but either can give rise to pathology when their
goals are frustrated or when they are inappropriately activated”
(Stevens and Price, p. 50). The rank or power/dominance sys-
tem “enables an individual to assess whether a rival is weaker or
stronger and to produce the appropriate response” (p. 75). This
system has been well-studied in fish, reptiles (MacLean, 1990), and
even crayfish (Panksepp and Huber, 2002), attesting to its ancient
lineage. In line with these concepts from evolutionary psychia-
try, we develop below a systematic proposal which incorporates a
rank/power/dominance system.
THE UNDERLYING PROPOSITIONS AND CRITERIA
Our proposals are based on the following series of causal
mechanisms:
1. Emotional systems emerged because they were causally effective
in changing behavioral patterns.
2. Emotional systems were selected for in terms of their enhance-
ment of survival resulting in the evolution of primary emo-
tional systems which then come to shape the development of
both intellectual capacities and secondary emotions.
3. Survival of individuals may be enhanced by group membership
that allows benefits in terms of food procurement, protection,
learning, and eventually culture.
4. To make group membership effective, there must be both group
cohesion mechanisms, and mechanisms for resolving conflict
and resource allocation tensions. These necessitate some form
of communication between members.
5. The attachment systems and the power/dominance system
evolved to meet the needs of individuals living in groups; they
supplement the basic systems for survival and learning.
6. Humans experience, particularly through subjective feelings
thereby induced, emotional operating systems whose mech-
anisms lie beneath psychological and developmental events
without awareness of their evolutionary origins and function.
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Following on this, one can propose a clear set of criteria charac-
terizing primary emotional systems based on evolutionary aspects.
We propose that a well-established primary system should have all
the following characteristics:
C1. Concept: It corresponds to a specific range of human affects
and characteristic behaviors, associated with clear eliciting stim-
uli and with universal affective outcomes, expressed in specific
bodily behavior which may include facial expressions.
C2. Structure: It is effective through specific neural circuitry
affected by a combination of transmitters, neuromodulators,
hormones, and cytokines and will ultimately be traceable by
neuroanatomical techniques. Each primary emotional circuit
supervenes on a distinct pattern of neural pathways rather than
on an exclusive set of structures. These circuits comprise dis-
tributed networks extending from brainstem to cortex; each is
integrated with the pathways of other primary emotions which
may utilize overlapping pathways.
C3. Function: Each primordial emotion system enlivens imme-
diate affective functioning and because a unique combination of
neurochemicals affects each core system, each can functionally
take part in neural selection during ontogeny of the brain.
C4. Development : Development of emotional systems will be ini-
tiated by multiple genes and therefore susceptible to alteration
by mutation or deletion. Environmental influences further affect
expression of these genes.
C5. Origin: On a phylogenetic level, each system can be associ-
ated with adaptations expressed in cladistic homologous traits
(Griffiths, 1997, p. 213), and hence can be clearly related to an
evolutionary process.
C6. Occurrence: These primordial emotional systems, associated
with homologous systems and evolutionary precursors, remain
universally influential in humans; this enables a correspondence
of the features listed above (2–5) between humans and other
vertebrates.
C7. Outcome: Dysfunctional aspects can be associated with
behavioral or psychiatric disorders, whose nature is related to
deletion of functions and/or disinhibition of lower level compo-
nents of its circuitry, or to over-activation of these functions; and
hence such disorders shed light on normal function.
One key problem is to separate what Panksepp (2000, 2005)
refers to as reflexive and sensory affects from true primary emo-
tional operating systems. We describe these operating systems
as action promoting valenced states with distinct circuitry and
neurochemistry, the initiation of which can precede or anticipate
potential environmental events and the consequences of which can
outlast the precipitating conditions. In contrast reflexive affects
(e.g., startle) are closely time-locked to triggering stimuli. An emo-
tion, therefore, is a superordinate program which orchestrates and
integrates the activities of various functional subprograms includ-
ing reflexive affects, perception, cognitive appraisals, and feeling
states (Cosmides and Tooby, 2000). Core emotional operating sys-
tems underlie complex, extremely flexible reactions by activating
or inhibiting autonomic, hormonal, and/or somatic changes. The
specific combination of behavioral components will depend on
context, experience, and eliciting stimulus.
A second key problem is to differentiate primary from sec-
ondary emotional systems. In principle items C1, C2, C3, and C4
should be universally consistent in core systems, but not neces-
sarily consistent for each secondary emotion. Secondary emotions
arise from interactions between primary emotional circuitry and
cognitions instantiated in neocortex (Panksepp, 2000; Prinz, 2004,
p. 144–147) whereas the primordial emotions are largely depen-
dent on subneocortical structures. Indeed the cortex is not always
necessary for emotion based functions (de Gelder et al., 2011;
Tamietto et al., 2012). We do not expect secondary emotions to
occur with as great universal consistency of structure and func-
tion nor do we expect widespread occurrence in other mammals.
Although there is no single criterion for discriminating primary
systems from secondary emotions, our proposal is based on con-
verging evidence from several methodologies (see Prinz, 2004, p.
90). We suggest that a good proposal can be made for a primary
emotional system when all of Items C1–C3 and C5, C6 above
occur; and is indisputable if the full set of items C1–C7 have been
established, with the cladistic link C5 being especially important.
Mere existence of a speculative evolutionary explanation is not
sufficient, but does lend weight to the consideration that we are
dealing with a primordial system.
THE RELATION BETWEEN NEEDS AND EMOTIONAL
SYSTEMS
In order to survive and pass on their genes all organisms require
the fulfillment of certain basic conditions or needs. The develop-
ment of emotional systems occurs in response to these biological,
safety, and social needs thus promoting goal-seeking behavior. The
primary emotions identified by Panksepp (1998) are1:
E1: The SEEKING system: incentive motivation, seeking,
expectancy.
E2: The RAGE system: rage/anger.
E3: The FEAR system: fear/anxiety.
E4: The LUST systems: lust/sexuality.
E5: The CARE system: providing parental care/nurturance.
E6: The PANIC system: panic/separation, need of care.
E7: The PLAY system: rough-housing, play/joy.
Table 1 summarizes our proposed completion of Panksepp’s
list, together with associated functions and relation to evolution-
ary needs. Each basic developmental need has been matched during
evolution by a corresponding core operating system that has become
genetically programmed in accord with the above theses. We fur-
ther propose that these primordial systems, adapted for survival
needs of individual organisms, embody selection criteria under-
lying neural connections thereby determining brain development.
Thus they provide affective valence (as reward/punishment mark-
ers) influencing cognitive and social development (as discussed
in Ellis and Toronchuk, 2005). The first group of systems relate
primarily to the functioning of individuals, and the second to
1The numbering system E1 to E7 is introduced in Ellis and Toronchuk (2005)
although we have changed the ordering in this paper. Panksepp uses capitalization
to denote emotional organizing systems rather than emotions per se and we retain
this designation.
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Table 1 | Evolutionary needs, and the emotional systems that have evolved to meet them.
Evolutionary needs met Primary emotional system Works with: Functions
INDIVIDUAL NEEDS
Basic Functioning E1: SEEKING system E2–9 Situation evaluation, incentive salience, hedonic appraisal,
facilitates learning
Basic survival E2: DISGUST system (repulsion,
avoidance)
Avoiding harmful foods, substances, environments
E3: RAGE system E4,E9 Defense: protection of organism, resources, and
conspecifics, limiting of restraint on movement
E4: FEAR System E3,E9 Defense: flight, limiting of tissue damage
SOCIAL NEEDS
Reproduction E5: LUST system (sexual desire,
satiation)
E6,E7 Ensuring procreation, enhancement of bonding
Group cohesion: bonding and
development
E6: PANIC/attachment (affiliation,
separation distress)
E5,E7 Protection of vulnerable individuals; creates bonding
through need for others
E7: CARE system E5,E6 Caring for others, particularly offspring
E8: PLAY system E6,E7 Bonding with conspecifics, development of basic adaptive,
and social skills, creativity
Group function: regulating
conflict
E9: POWER/dominance system (rank,
status, submission)
E3,E4,E5 Limiting aggression in social groups: allocating resources,
esp. sexual ones
E1 is a generalized system providing incentive for the others and this dependence is noted only once. The systems are renumbered from Ellis and Toronchuk (2005),
in line with our present scheme. The new numbering system will be retained in this paper.
functioning of individuals in social groups. Although we have used
this distinction as a broad classification, we stress that it is not
essential to our proposal. (Compare, e.g., Buck’s (1999) grouping
of selfish vs. social biological emotions corresponding to right vs.
left hemisphere activation.)
BASIC FUNCTIONING
Panksepp has proposed that the SEEKING System is the primary
task-oriented pathway by which affective goals are met (Panksepp,
1998). This generalized system activated by primary biological
needs and characterized by homeostatic detection mechanisms,
can also function in a non-specific manner. Other primary emo-
tional systems (in our proposal labeled E3–E9), each characterized
by a genre of intention and intensity of desire, feed information to
the SEEKING system, as do secondary emotions thereby affecting
overall motivational state2. Through inclusion of conscious voli-
tional goals in E1, intentions and resulting purposive action gain
emotive power: “I want that job,” “I need that house,” and so on,
have affective components. This ultimately influences the way that
ethical choices and values (the basis on which we choose accept-
able actions) become effective in guiding action, as they too have
underlying affective components.
2While it is possible for each goal to have separate seeking and pleasure systems,
resulting in a combinatorial increase of complexity, it is more economical to have
many systems utilizing the same superordinate seeking and pleasure systems. The
dopamine and opiate pathways are both generalized and responsive to many stimuli
(see Berridge, 2004; Smith et al., 2009).
Evidence now suggests (e.g., Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008;
Berridge et al., 2009) that reward functions are parsed into two
components – a motivational, appetitive system (corresponding
to Panksepp’s SEEKING/expectancy system), and a distinct hedo-
nic appraisal or consummatory system. This “wanting” vs “liking”
distinction is supported by the fact that addiction involves craving
but not necessarily satisfaction (Robinson and Berridge, 2003).
The relevant neural pathways normally function together, but can
be behaviorally dissociated (e.g., Knutson et al., 2001; Cannon and
Bseikri, 2004), even in fish (Spector, 2000) suggesting the division
is of ancient origins.
The earliest protovertebrate ancestors would of necessity had
consummatory appraisal responses even before appetitive seek-
ing behaviors evolved, hence “liking” might be considered the
primordial reward system. In mammals the lowest level for hedo-
nic appraisal must reside in the brainstem as decerebrate rats
and anencephalic infants also show hedonic responses (Steiner
et al., 2001). Although taste, which relies on medullary nuclei,
was probably the earliest effective stimulus, the ventral pallidum,
nucleus accumbens, and several other forebrain structures evolved
to process and respond to pleasurable stimuli in many modalities.
Thus in our model the multi-modal nature of hedonic appraisal
parallels that of the general purpose SEEKING system described
by Panksepp (see, e.g., Kelley and Berridge, 2002; Burgdorf and
Panksepp, 2006).
The mesolimbic dopamine system, extending from mid-
brain ventral tegmental area (VTA), lateral hypothalamus,
nucleus accumbens shell to orbitofrontal cortex, was traditionally
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implicated in the neural basis of reward; however it is now rec-
ognized that both “wanting” and “liking” mechanisms also utilize
endogenous opioids (Levine and Billington, 2004; Peciña, 2008)
and the ventral pallidum is a necessary component of the path-
way (Smith et al., 2009). These systems play a fundamental role
in learning, possibly by associating arousal with specific activities,
thereby attaching a positive affective value to them and then acting
as a stimulus for repetition of these activities (see, e.g., Wise, 2004;
Rolls, 2005).
Following Panksepp’s (1998) suggestion that the SEEKING sys-
tem evolved to provide a common currency of reward, we suggest
that facilitated by associated hedonic appraisals there exists a prim-
itive system shaping general coordination of affective responses.
The dopamine system is activated not only by food, drugs, sex,
electrical stimulation, and monetary reward, but also by aversive
stimuli with response segregation according to positive or negative
valence occurring in separate regions of the nucleus accumbens
and pallidum (Kelley and Berridge, 2002; Smith et al., 2009). The
ventral pallidum also responds to a wide variety of food, sexual,
and affiliative cues (e.g., Rauch et al., 1999; Dillon et al., 2009;
reviewed in Smith et al., 2009).
Psychological illnesses that Panksepp associates with malfunc-
tioning of the SEEKING system include addictions and cravings,
eating disorders, and possibly schizophrenia (see Panksepp, 1998;
Panksepp and Harro, 2004). Panksepp (2002) considers obsessive
compulsive behaviors to be malfunctions of this system, however,
we suggest below that washing symptoms may arise instead from
malfunctions of a primordial DISGUST system, while symptoms
of checking and hoarding may arise from circuitry originating
phylogenetically in a POWER/dominance system.
BASIC SURVIVAL
In previous papers (Toronchuk and Ellis, 2007a,b) we described
a primitive emotional system which, analogous to SEEKING, can
be activated by various sensory modalities and ideational com-
ponents, but with opposite functions to SEEKING. We designate
this as the DISGUST system rather than AVOIDANCE or AVER-
SION because of the previous inclusion of disgust in various lists
of basic emotions from Darwin onward. Together SEEKING and
DISGUST would have been the primal opposing operating sys-
tems for ancestral organisms. In our model DISGUST evolved
from primitive chemosensory mechanisms adapted to both avoid
pathogens and their toxins and eject them from the gut if necessary.
We propose this occurred in conjunction with the development of
interaction between the immune and nervous systems (c.f. dis-
cussion in Ellis and Toronchuk, 2005; Rubio-Godoy et al., 2007)
because non-specific (innate) immune cells are found in almost all
multicelled organisms. Evolutionary adaptation would then lead
to learned avoidance of toxic or infected material before ingestion,
as opposed to vomiting afterward, ultimately giving rise to the sub-
jective human experience of disgust as an anticipatory mechanism
for avoidance.
The DISGUST system meets the criteria we enumerate above
for primary emotional operating systems (Toronchuk and Ellis,
2007a,b, but see Panksepp, 2007). This system is intended as a par-
allel mechanism to appetitive SEEKING. Much broader than the
sensory affect distaste, disgust is elicited by olfactory, gustatory,
auditory, tactile, or visual cues (see Curtis and Biran, 2001; Cur-
tis et al., 2004). Therefore it is not restricted to avoiding bad
taste, but hinges on avoidance of contamination (Rozin and
Fallon, 1987; Haidt et al., 1997; Rozin et al., 2009). Our pro-
posal is that nutritional-, sexual-, and socially-related stimuli plus
ideational components are all able to activate either the SEEKING
or DISGUST systems in analogous ways.
We suggest that the disgust response did not arise merely as a
reaction to bad taste, but due to association with increased likeli-
hood of illness as proposed above (Curtis et al., 2004). Serotonin
release is essential for development of disgust reactions and its
use by the gut, vagus nerve, brainstem disgust mechanisms, and
immune signaling suggests a defensive continuum of immune and
disgust systems linked by serotonin (Rubio-Godoy et al., 2007).
Negative hedonic value is not necessary for disgust as shown by
conditioned taste aversions (CTA) elicited to sweet tastes paired
with illness (e.g., Garcia et al., 1974; Parker et al., 2008). Condi-
tioned immune responses may form from single pairings of novel
taste with antigens (Pacheco-Lopez et al., 2004) further suggesting
to us an evolutionary role for the immune system in disgust. For-
mation of a CTA requires activation of the insula (Ferreira et al.,
2006) a structure which compares incoming and stored tastes (Koh
and Bernstein, 2005). Rats with insular lesions fail to learn antic-
ipatory discrimination although they remain capable of hedonic
responses (Kesner and Gilbert, 2007).
Human anterior insula (AI), containing the gustatory cortex,
also plays a role in self-awareness (reviewed in Toronchuk and Ellis,
2007a). It is activated during experience, observation, and imagi-
nation of disgust (Jabbi et al., 2008). Insular responses to aversive
tastes vary according to expectations (Nitschke et al., 2006) and
disgust sensitivity (Calder et al., 2007) as predicted for a primary
emotional system. Although many behaviors integrating higher
cognitive processing with “gut level” feelings also activate it (see
Saper, 2002), AI does not provide a simple module for disgust but
functions together with other areas including the basal ganglia to
instantiate a variety of interoceptive bodily and conscious feeling
states (Calder et al., 2001). The adjacent orbitofrontal cortex also
plays a major role in taste, smell, and visceral responses and in
assigning reward values to stimuli (Rolls, 2005; Rolls and Graben-
horst, 2008). Recent brain imaging research consistent with our
proposal for separate DISGUST and SEEKING systems, suggests
two regions of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex with different pat-
terns of connectivity are differentially involved in approach and
avoidance as parts of a network including orbitofrontal cortex,
cingulate, amygdala, and basal ganglia (Spielberg et al., 2012).
Increased cortical integration of body states occurs in primates
because the insula receives direct thalamocortical taste and visceral
input which in rodents arrives indirectly via the amygdala (Craig,
2005). Emotional contagion or “resonance” is a further adaptation
promoting disgust activation when observing socially relevant dis-
gust responses in conspecifics (Wicker et al., 2003; von dem Hagen
et al., 2009). The insula may also play a role in social evaluation
cognition as a viscero-motor center which simulates the activ-
ity of others in a manner similar to “mirror” neurons previously
described in monkeys (Gallese et al., 2004; Keysers and Gazzola,
2007). Cognitive processing allows primitive DISGUST impulses
to be melded with social learning to produce secondary emotions
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incorporating social status and morality. Activation patterns of
facial muscles in response to unpleasant tastes, contaminated
objects, and unfair treatment are consistent with the suggestion
of shared neural evaluative mechanisms for distaste, olfactory dis-
gust and moral disgust (Chapman et al., 2009). The role of the
insula in awareness of disgust in self and others, possibly facili-
tated by von Economo neurons in AI and adjacent orbitofrontal
area, may be a preadaptation setting in motion the development
of theory of mind and moral reasoning. We are thus suggesting
that the primitive emotive circuit which originally functioned to
defend the self by regulating consummatory behaviors contributes
to an emotional system which facilitates some of the most highly
developed human capacities of social evaluation (Toronchuk and
Ellis, 2007a,b).
Disgust sensitivity is inversely correlated with sensation seeking
(Haidt et al., 1994) further suggesting that DISGUST and SEEK-
ING represent opposing operating systems which might then be
reflected in contrasting behavioral traits and psychiatric disorders.
Genetic influence in disgust sensitivity (Olatunji and Broman-
Fulks, 2007; Kang et al., 2010) is consistent with the finding
that even presymptomatic genetic carriers of Huntington’s dis-
ease show selective deficits in recognition of disgust (Hennenlotter
et al., 2004) and insular size in presymptomatic patients is corre-
lated with disgust recognition (Kipps et al., 2007). In contrast
increased activation of the insula in OCD patients is associated
with contamination, specifically washing-related symptoms (Stein
et al., 2001; Shapira et al., 2003). Phillips and Mataix-Cols (2004)
find that patterns of brain activation in OCD patients in response
to disgust or anxiety-producing objects vary according to the
patient’s major symptom type. Brain activation to disgust stimuli
occurs independently of anxiety again supporting the view that
OCD typified by contamination/washing symptoms represents an
underlying malfunction of the DISGUST system (Husted et al.,
2006; Lawrence et al., 2006).
In contrast to internal threat, protection from external sources
was phylogenetically provided by the RAGE E3 and FEAR Systems
E4 described in detail by Panksepp (1998). Previous experience
and assessment of the present circumstances determines the final
behavioral outcome of these systems in higher organisms. As with
DISGUST certain stimuli are predisposed to easily activate FEAR
(Öhman and Mineka, 2001) and as with DISGUST the same struc-
tures activated during the production of fear and anger are also
activated in humans during recognition of fear and anger in oth-
ers (Calder et al., 2001; see discussion in Goldman and Sripada,
2005). Panksepp suggests that certain psychological disorders such
as aggression,psychopathic tendencies, and related personality dis-
orders might be correlated with the malfunctioning of the RAGE
system; while anxiety disorders, phobias, and PTSD variants might
be associated with malfunctioning in the FEAR system (Panksepp,
2002).
REPRODUCTION
Sexual reproduction, an obvious necessity for evolutionary selec-
tion, is the outcome of the LUST system E5 which also infers
“wanting” and “liking” components. As with the SEEKING system
the appetitive and consummatory aspects can function indepen-
dently with corresponding behavioral dissociation (Pfaus, 1996;
Kippin et al., 2004). The transition from reptiles to mammals
brought about modifications in this ancient system to produce
the attachment necessary for lactation (Panksepp, 1998). Thus
the circuitry for LUST is biochemically related to that of both
PANIC/attachment (or separation) and CARE. Due to different
mating strategies, the complex relationship between LUST, PANIC,
and CARE likely differs in males and females giving rise to different
attachment styles in adult humans (see Taylor, 2006; Del Giudice,
2009).
All the social emotional systems are mediated by hormones,
synaptic signaling, and other biochemical signals as employed
by other elements of the underlying primordial value systems.
Social emotions can be therefore causally effective in terms of con-
tributing to neural selection because these signals also affect brain
plasticity. Oxytocin and vasopressin in particular function as neu-
romodulators in the value systems associated with both adult social
bonds and parental behavior (reviewed in Carter, 1998, 2003). For
example during mating vasopressin is released in the ventral pal-
lidum and nucleus accumbens (areas associated with SEEKING)
of male prairie voles; its blockade prevents pair bond formation
(Lim and Young, 2004). In addition, vasopressin plays a role in
sexual competition (see e.g., Sewards and Sewards, 2003a).
In parallel with the SEEKING system, dopamine is associated
more with the appetitive phase of LUST and endogenous opi-
oids more with the consummatory phase. Dopamine secretion
increases with sexual arousal, but at consummation dopamine
decreases while secretion of oxytocin and opioids increase (Pfaus,
1996; Van Ree et al., 2000). The neural circuitry of this system
includes among other areas prefrontal, insular, and anterior cin-
gulate cortex along with amygdalar, hypothalamic, and other sub-
cortical areas (Stoléru et al., 2012). These cortical areas are highly
interconnected with the amygdala and are also prominent in social
bonding. The malfunctioning of this system might be reflected
in fetishes and sexual addictions (Panksepp, 2002), and disor-
ders of desire and orgasm resulting from either over-activation
or under-activation of the subcomponents.
PRIMARY EMOTIONAL SYSTEMS OF SOCIAL BONDING
CARE, PANIC, PLAY are also important emotions of social behav-
ior discussed in detail by Panksepp (1998, 2002) Here we discuss
primarily their crucial roles in sculpting mammalian social and
cognitive development. According to MacLean (1990, p. 247)
the differentiation of mammals from reptiles involved (1) lac-
tation and associated maternal care, (2) vocal communication to
maintain mother-infant contact, and (3) playful behavior facil-
itating social learning. Because lactation and maternal care are
essential for mammalian survival, significant selection pressure
would act on the neural mechanisms controlling these behaviors.
In mammals social bonding is initially effected primarily by the
PANIC/attachment (E6) system in the young, which triggers emo-
tional panic during separation, but signals contentment during
closeness. This necessitated the tandem development of a comple-
mentary CARE (E7) system, through which parents respond to the
young. Panksepp’s (1998) PANIC system basically concerns sepa-
ration distress; however, we suggest that distress is only one mode
because the system also operates in a positive fashion when needs
are satisfied. We propose that subjective feelings in the human
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infant include both panic/distress during separation, and also
contentment/comfort during contact (E6); and in the care-giver,
tenderness/affection, carrying over to reciprocal distress when the
infant is perceived as in distress (E7).
The biological origins of human sadness may be rooted in an
extended system used earlier in phylogeny for pain perception but
which now includes the cingulate gyrus that mediates separation
distress in infant mammals (Panksepp, 1998, 2003b). This origin is
supported by the role of endogenous opioids in both pain reduc-
tion and positive feelings brought on by contact. Similar to the
case of distaste and DISGUST, an early sensory affect (pain) per-
haps gave rise to a basic emotional system (PANIC/attachment).
Relational loss is thus perceived in humans as similar to pain and
panic. Both adult and infant bonding are mediated by oxytocin
(Carter, 1998, 2003; Insell and Young, 2001; Lim and Young, 2004;
Taylor, 2006; Bos et al., 2012) perhaps also due to phylogenetic
origin. Estrogen further enhances the effects of oxytocin, which
may provide a basis for gender differences in human attachment
styles (see Taylor, 2006; Del Giudice, 2009).
The long period of helplessness in hominid infants combined
with a need for training in foraging and social behaviors likely
put considerable selection pressure on the neural circuitry for
emotional attachment between mother and infant. Ape mothers’
use of gestures and facial expressions plays a key role in com-
munication with infants, who correspondingly develop an intense
interest in the mother’s face Falk, 2004). Chimp mothers teach
which foods are edible, and perhaps even tool use (Goodall, 1986;
Falk, 2004). Chimp infants communicate various types of dis-
tress through specific vocalizations. Hominid evolution therefore
involved tandem evolution of emotional circuitry in adults, in
order to provide emotional nurturance and instruction, and par-
allel circuitry in the young to seek and respond to caregivers. This
entailed increasing use of gesture, facial expression, tactile, and
vocal communication. According to this scenario, the lengthening
period of dependency in early humans due to increased brain size
and subsequent immaturity at birth selected for even more skilled
caretaking and teaching ability on the part of adults. Although the
effects of early emotion on individual adult emotional and social
behavior has been well-studied, the evolutionary role of infant
emotion as a selection factor in cognitive development has been
less well researched. According to the theory we suggest, mother-
infant communication provided emotional motivation for the
development of language. Learning in infants is critically enabled
by reciprocal interaction with the care-giver (e.g., Schore, 1994).
The ability for shared attention becomes necessary for the devel-
opment of a theory of other minds and language use. Thus social
emotions provide the valenced state necessary for infant learning,
initially developed to predict and respond to actions and emotions
of the care-giver. This provides a major example of how cognition
is molded in part by emotion, and emotion in turn comes to be
regulated by cognition.
Tactile stimulation in infancy mediates upregulation of gluco-
corticoid receptors in the hippocampus through DNA methyla-
tion, an effect which in rodents persists throughout life (Kauf-
man and Meaney, 2007). Upregulation decreases reactivity of the
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis via negative feedback.
Early tactile stimulation of female rodents regulates expression
of estrogen receptors in the medial preoptic area, resulting in
adulthood in increased oxytocin receptor binding with subsequent
increased licking, grooming, and nursing. Nurturant maternal
care also enhances learning by enhancing NMDA receptor activ-
ity in the hippocampus. These mechanisms may all be conserved
from rodents to humans (Kaufman and Meaney, 2007). Consis-
tent with this, human adults who experienced childhood adversity
both rate reward cues less positively and show less response in the
reward-evaluating pallidum (Dillon et al., 2009). Together these
effects illustrate the long-term influence of the PANIC and CARE
circuitry on emotional and cognitive behaviors.
It seems worth investigating whether gender differences in
stress responses (e.g., Dalla et al., 2008) might be related to
demethylation of estrogen receptors in early life as described by
Kauffman and Meaney (or other nurturant behaviors), thus affect
attachment style. Specifically human males show more avoidant
attachment, and females more ambivalent attachment from mid-
dle childhood through adulthood (Del Giudice, 2009). Fight and
flight behavior is more typical of males under stress, while oxytocin
facilitates tend and befriend behavior in females (Taylor, 2006).
Separation of infant and caretaker can lead to physical and
emotional stunting as described by Rene Spitz in the 1940s, a con-
cept that was later expanded by Harlow while the long term impact
of maternal care on children was confirmed by Bowlby (Van der
Horst and van der Veer, 2008). Panksepp predicts malfunctioning
in these social systems, combined with other environmental fac-
tors, are associated with panic attacks, pathological grief, some
types of depression, agoraphobia, social phobias, dependency,
attachment disorders, and perhaps also be a contributing factor to
autism (Panksepp, 2002). Nemeroff et al. (2006) seem to suggest an
association with post-traumatic stress disorder. Thus, the PANIC
and CARE systems facilitated evolution of human social bonding,
altruistic behavior, and possibly influenced language evolution,
while disruption is predicted to lead to numerous psychological
disorders (see Toronchuk and Ellis, 2009).
LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT
The interaction between emotion and cognition becomes espe-
cially apparent in the life-long processes involved in learning.
Although learning is enabled by the primordial SEEKING system
(see Berridge et al., 2009) it is ontologically dependent in mam-
mals on the circuitry for PLAY E8. The importance of mammalian
play as preparation for adult food procurement and social roles,
suggests that play should be considered a basic emotional program
necessary for normal human cognitive development. It was facil-
itated evolutionarily by cortical enlargement and the prolonged
interaction necessitated by lactation (MacLean, 1990). Develop-
mentally play is also influenced by the interaction between CARE
and PANIC. Play involves learning social roles and behaviors (e.g.,
Bekoff and Byers, 1998; Brosnan, 2006; Keltner et al., 2006) and
allows assessment of social commitments and dominance.
Extensive mother-infant play in chimps and especially bono-
bos is characterized by facial gestures, vocalizations, and laugh-
ter (reviewed in Falk, 2004). It is possible that optimal cortical
plasticity depends on the rewarding effects provided by these
interactions. Allowing juvenile rats 30 min of “rough and tum-
ble play” results in increased BDNF transcription in the amygdala
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and dorsolateral frontal cortex (Gordon et al., 2003). Although
much anecdotal information suggests an important role in human
learning, the underlying neurophysiological mechanisms are not
yet defined.
Panksepp (1998) includes “rough and tumble play” in the list
of primary emotions, but we speculate that in humans the neural
activation has been extended to facilitate representational and
intellectually imaginative play. Evidence exists that both captive
and wild apes may engage in representational play in which one
object comes to stand for another (Lyn et al., 2006). We conjecture
that the phylogenetic transition from “rough and tumble play” to
representational play facilitated the evolution of language through
development of a mechanism allowing symbolic representation. A
theory of other minds, another factor in imaginative play, is likely
necessary for language evolution. Play thus remains particularly
important in the ontogenetic processes of language development
(see Bruner, 1983; Paley, 2004; Zigler et al., 2004).
Many aspects of human culture such as the performing arts,
ceremonial, and celebratory behavior, and even creativity in sci-
ence ultimately depend on extensions of these mechanisms (see
Frost et al., 2001). Humor with embedded dominance paradigms
in which we “make fun” of others could be another expression
of rough and tumble activity. Social aspects such as turn tak-
ing and feinting may also contribute to development of altruistic
behavior. A detailed assessment of the PLAY system, and the
associated role of opioids, is given by Panksepp (1998, 2002).
He suggests that attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, mania,
and perhaps impulse control disorders may be associated with its
malfunctioning.
GROUP FUNCTION: REGULATING CONFLICT AND COMPETITION
A main point of the present paper is to propose that a primor-
dial POWER/dominance System, concerned with territoriality,
dominance, and subordination should be added to the list of
basic emotional operating circuits. Several recent studies discussed
below are consistent with the presence in humans of a neural sys-
tem involved in the determination of status (reviewed in Beasley
et al., 2012). The widespread existence of dominance displays
among vertebrates suggests ancient evolutionary origins. Group
living may enhance individual survival via cooperative food pro-
curement, protection, and learning, but also entails competition
for resources. Selection pressure therefore likely favored the devel-
opment of mechanisms which communicated the dominant status
of some individuals, while allowing survival of those subordinates
who participate in cooperative group activities providing them
with a chance for future reproduction. Panksepp (1998, 2002,
2007) describes social dominance as arising from interactions
between the neural circuitry underlying childhood PLAY and that
underlying adult FEAR and RAGE. Although ontogenetic devel-
opment of dominance in individuals is often enabled by play, we
point out that dominance is phylogenetically much more ancient
than play. According to MacLean (1990) play was first important
among mammals.
Allocation of rank leads to agonic behavior which regulates
competition while minimizing tension (e.g., De Waal, 1996, pp.
89–125; Stevens and Price, 2002, pp. 49–52). Human territorial
and sexual competition has been extended to include material
resources, social control, status symbols, and intellectual turf.
Personal identity, therefore, comes to be closely influenced by “ter-
ritorial” tendencies3. Based on data from psychiatry and ethology,
we propose that the ancient system of dominance and submissive
subroutines is the phylogenetic precursor to competition for sta-
tus, the need to excel, and obtain social approval. With a few mod-
ifications it is similar to the “power dominance” drive that Sewards
and Sewards (2003b) propose as foundational to Nietzsche’s will
to power and Winter’s (1973) implicit power motive.
Price et al. (2007) point out that elevated mood facilitates a
rise in rank which enables coping with leadership, while depressed
mood allows lower ranking individuals to communicate accep-
tance of their status and forgo reward. The desire for higher rank
is associated with feelings of pride/high self-esteem during success
and shame/low self-esteem or depression during defeat4. They
locate the instinctual aspects of depression as largely a function
of the striatal complex of MacLean’s reptilian brain. This area was
responsible for ancient instinctual behavior patterns used in rep-
tilian display, while limbic structures were only recruited after the
evolution of mammals (MacLean, 1990).
The striatal complex, particularly the basal ganglia, plays a
major role in vertebrate dominance behaviors. Its activation occurs
during social/territorial displays among male lizards along with
release of serotonin and dopamine in different patterns corre-
lated with dominance and subordination (MacLean, 1990; Baxter,
2001). The localization of serotonin and dopamine is similar in
lizard and primate basal ganglia inferring similar mechanisms
(Baxter, 2003). Lesions in globus pallidus of the mammalian basal
ganglia disrupt dominance and courtship displays given by male
monkeys (MacLean, 1990; Newman, 2003) while non-sexual com-
petitive arousal activates the human ventral pallidum associated
with reward (Rauch et al., 1999). The ventral striatum has also
been shown to be active in humans during value assessments of
socioeconomic status (Ly et al., 2011). The basal ganglia, as Price
suggests, may mediate those components of depression which act
as appeasement displays after loss of agonistic encounters. The role
of the ventral pallidum in reward assessment (Smith et al., 2009)
may thus be relevant to this type of depression.
In addition to the striatal system, the ventromedial prefrontal,
anterior cingulate cortices (ACC), and amygdala are also involved
in the POWER system of humans (Beasley et al., 2012). Vari-
ous prefrontal areas contribute to perception of status (Karafin
et al., 2004; Zink et al., 2008; Marsh et al., 2009) and also in
OCD (Baxter, 2003; Blackford and Pine, 2012). The prefrontal
and nearby anterior cingulate areas have multiple diverse con-
nections to the amygdala which allow for both top-down and
bottom-up regulation (Ray and Zald, 2012). The amygdala thus
provides non-conscious regulation of these cortical areas. ACC is
activated during competitive arousal (Rauch et al., 1999); and low
activity here is implicated in the pathogenesis of depression with
different subregions of ACC playing differential roles (see David-
son et al., 2002). Sewards and Sewards (2002, 2003b) describe
3We thank Ian MacCallum for pointing this out.
4Guilt, however, relates to failure to live up to expectations of self or others; thus
it is a secondary emotion-related to ethical behavior rather than to ranking (see
discussion below).
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an area of ACC (referred to as BA 32) as participating in the
“power dominance” drive and equate this area with the infral-
imbic area identified in hamsters as responsible for dominance
(Kollack-Walker et al., 1999). Stewards and Stewards propose the
major contribution of this area is to the learned, voluntary compo-
nents of the power dominance drive rather than the involuntary
components which are mediated elsewhere. Volumetric analysis
of an area including BA32 reveals a negative correlation with self-
reports of perceived social status, without a corresponding change
in amygdala (Gianaros et al., 2007). In Price’s model, following
MacLean, these involuntary components would be controlled by
the basal ganglia.
Activation of submissive circuitry may lead to depression (see
Price, 1967; Gilbert, 1992; Stevens and Price, 2002; Price et al.,
2004, 2007), which is a possible human counterpart of social defeat
(e.g., Weisfeld and Wendorf, 2000; Sloman et al., 2003; Kroes et al.,
2007). Low status is known to be a major risk factor for depressive
behavior (e.g., Gilbert and Allan, 1998; Panksepp et al., 2002) and
adverse health effects in humans and other primates (Sapolsky,
2005), and according to MacLean even in reptiles.
Biochemical activation of this circuitry occurs in part by sero-
tonin, which plays a general background role in numerous emo-
tional systems, and may increase dominance by decreasing impul-
sive, species-typical behaviors. Low serotonin levels are reported
in numerous psychiatric disorders including depression, suicide,
anxiety, aggression, addiction, and OCD. Dominance behaviors
and serotonin levels influence one another in both vertebrates and
invertebrates (e.g., crayfish, Panksepp and Huber, 2002). An exam-
ple from Anolis lizards is that manipulation of dominance rela-
tionships leads to changes in serotonin levels in several brain areas
including basal ganglia (Korzan and Summers, 2004). In hamsters
dominance status is also reported to affect serotonin transporter
expression (Morrison et al., 2011). Serotonin levels correlate with
rank order in vervet monkeys; social standing among individual
monkeys has been manipulated by altering its level (Raleigh et al.,
1991). Increasing serotonin by means of oral tryptophan increases
dominance behavior in human males (Moskowitz et al., 2003)
while decreasing serotonin reuptake reduces submissive behaviors.
Several hormones and neuropeptides also play direct roles even
in human dominance behaviors (reviewed by Bos et al., 2012).
Testosterone increases dominance behaviors in humans (Archer,
2006) and macaques (Rilling et al., 2004), and it is suggested the
effects in both sexes probably correlate more with status behav-
iors than direct aggression (Eisenegger et al., 2010). Although
testosterone may increase competitiveness and dominance, high
testosterone accompanied by low serotonin may lead to impul-
sivity and therefore pathological aggression (Birger et al., 2003).
Social defeat in rodents (Panksepp et al., 2007) results in wide-
spread decreases in cholecystokinin (CCK) while play behavior
produces increased levels of CCK (Burgdorf and Panksepp, 2006).
In these rats social defeat also increased levels of corticotrophin
releasing hormone (CRH), a change otherwise associated with
depression (see Brown et al., 2004). Another biochemical simi-
larity between animal social defeat and human depression is the
finding that interleukin 18, over-expressed in depressed humans,
is also increased following social defeat in rats (Panksepp et al.,
2007).
Vasopressin, and its non-mammalian homolog vasotocin, facil-
itates aggressive and dominance related behaviors in many species
and is itself modulated by testosterone and serotonin (reviewed
by Bos et al., 2012). In human males vasopressin administration
modulates activity and effective connectivity in the subgenual cin-
gulate cortex during processing of facial emotions by abolishing
fear-related decreases in cingulate activity (Zink et al., 2010). Zink
et al. also suggest this cingulate area might be involved in a neg-
ative feedback loop with the amygdala. Increased vasopressin is
further linked to human OCD (Altemus et al., 1992); and may
play a role in some forms of stress-related depression (Landgraf,
2006). Sewards and Sewards (2003a,b) proposed that vasopressin
is the primary generator of the “power dominance” drive. Given
experimentally to men and women, however, it has a differen-
tial effect, producing increased agonistic behavior in men and
increased affiliative behavior in women (Thompson et al., 2006),
again suggesting gender differences in the normal development
of aggression and nurturant-related neural circuitry. Social subju-
gation of hamsters decreases levels of vasopressin in the anterior
hypothalamus (Delville et al., 1998). In contrast microinjection
into this area triggers stereotypical behaviors (grooming and scent
marking) thought to model human OCD but these behaviors are
suppressed by drugs used in its treatment (Ferris et al., 2001).
Taken together the involvement of the basal ganglia, vaso-
pressin, and serotonin in social dominance and OCD may be con-
sistent with the view of Stevens and Price (2002) that some forms
of OCD can be a disorder of POWER/dominance. MacLean origi-
nally proposed that some OCD might be the result of inappropri-
ate release of territorial and defensive motor program fragments
underlying checking and perhaps hoarding, but not washing-type
symptoms of OCD. A second hypothesis regarding POWER is that
at times depression might result from triggering the involuntary
subordination response of animals losing competitive encounters,
i.e., some forms of depression may also represent disorders of
rank (e.g., Gilbert, 1992; Gilbert and Allan, 1998; Sloman, 2000).
While it has been further suggested that the involuntary subor-
dination response may have phylogenetic origins in separation
distress because both are characterized by negative mood, loss of
self-confidence, and result in decreased activity (Sloman et al.,
2003) however, it should be pointed out that the ancient domi-
nance and subordination system is also present in reptiles with no
known attachment systems.
Weisfeld and Wendorf (2000), building on Beck’s differentia-
tion of sociotropy and autonomy, propose that depression assumes
two forms. Sociotropy, they suggest, is a personality characteristic
related to attachment and the need to please others, while they
describe autonomy as related to independence and attainment
of goals. Depression which results from loss of status and often
involving pride, guilt, and/or shame might therefore be differen-
tiated from depression associated with grief or loneliness. These
two characteristics are expressed in different symptoms (Robins
et al., 1989) with autonomous traits more likely to respond bet-
ter to antidepressant medication than sociotropic traits (Peselow
et al., 1992). Also in the non-clinical population low moods are
associated with different behaviors depending on whether such
moods are precipitated by social losses or failure to reach a goal
(Keller and Nesse, 2005).
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Consistent with the notion of two forms of depression dis-
cussed above, the physiology and the developmental course of
depression might differ according to whether it is precipitated by
separation distress or by loss of status. In line with this notion,
oxytocin reduces separation distress, but not low rank; separation
anxiety involves parts of cingulate cortex, while in humans, dom-
inance perception, pride, and shame might more preferentially
involve components of orbitofrontal/prefrontal cortex (Panksepp,
1998; Weisfeld and Wendorf, 2000; Karafin et al., 2004; Marsh
et al., 2009). Another study suggesting two forms of depression
differentiated by social components, reported left frontal activa-
tion in depressives scoring high in reassurance-seeking, but relative
right frontal activation in those low in reassurance-seeking (Min-
nix et al., 2004. Although speculative and not necessary for our
theory, differential laterality may relate to Gray’s (1987, 1990)
BAS/BIS distinction or Buck’s (1999) selfish vs. social division.
Weisfeld and Wendorf note the similarity between subordination
displays and the behavior of individuals whose depression is asso-
ciated with shame, guilt, and failure, e.g., averted gaze, slumped
posture, and slowed responses.
In summary, we propose that in addition to the systems listed
by Panksepp, there is a genetically determined emotional operat-
ing system which influences dominance and subordination with
instinctual motor components based in the basal ganglia and emo-
tional components based in limbic structures and modulated by
cingulate and prefrontal areas. The development of neocortex
allowed for integration with cognition leading to the emergence of
more precise human secondary emotions such as guilt, shame and
jealousy. We propose malfunctioning of this POWER/dominance
system might take two forms: over-activation of subordination
programs might result in depression; over-activation of domi-
nance programs might be related to checking,ordering,and hoard-
ing symptoms of OCD. In contrast OCD with washing symptoms
more likely arises from malfunction in the DISGUST system as
proposed above; while we suggest depression with sociotropic
symptoms is mediated by the PANIC/attachment system.
CONCLUSION
According to the proposals of Affective Neuronal Selection, the
primordial emotional operating systems play a major role in deter-
mining the details of higher brain functions such as cognition and
secondary emotions. We think it therefore useful to use the criteria
C1–C7 above as assessment tools in analysis of the necessary and
sufficient variables underlying later brain development (Ellis and
Toronchuk, 2005). A summary of the operating systems we include
is given in Table 3. On the basis of evolutionary we have added (a)
the DISGUST system E2 and (b) the POWER/dominance system
E9 to those included in our previous paper (based on Panksepp,
1998).
Since the time of Darwin (e.g., Tomkins, 1962; Ekman, 1972,
1992; Izard, 1992; Damasio, 2003; Plutchik, 2003) various lists of
so called human “basic emotions” have been suggested. Our pro-
posal is unique in seeking to characterize those phylogenetically
influenced primordial systems which influence neural develop-
ment and thereby influence later behavior and disorders. Virtually
all previous lists of such basic human emotions include Happi-
ness, Sadness, Fear, and Anger, and most include Disgust and/or
Contempt. Some suggest Surprise and Interest, or less frequently
Guilt or Shame. In our model Panksepp’s PANIC executive system
(Panksepp, 2003b) underlies sadness by mediating attachment and
pain of separation. We argue that it is useful when referring to
operating systems rather than human affects to parse SEEKING
into incentive salience and hedonic appraisal, two components
which may be separately accessed by other emotions (Berridge and
Robinson, 2003; Berridge et al., 2009). While the PLAY executive
system is certainly associated with joy or happiness (Panksepp,
1998), we suggest happiness is more broadly based and corre-
sponds to generalized hedonic appraisal based in “liking” and
interest in the “wanting” subsystem.
In contrast, we do not consider Surprise to be a primordial
system, for despite its inclusion in many lists of basic human emo-
tions, it does not have the same nature as other affect programs
(Griffiths, 1997, p. 241), is not necessarily valenced (Ortony and
Turner, 1990; Ekman, 1992; Prinz, 2004, p. 163), and gives no spe-
cific action guidance for survival. However, like the startle reflex, it
may serve to activate the SEEKING circuitry. We do not consider
contempt, embarrassment, shame,and guilt as candidates for emo-
tional organizing systems because firstly they are uniquely human;
and secondly they rely largely on neocortical functions and so are
more plausibly secondary emotions. Shame and guilt are likely
secondary emotions emerging from cognitive interactions with
the POWER/dominance circuitry (see Gilbert and Allan, 1998).
Sabini and Silver (2005) argue for the inclusion of love and jeal-
ousy as basic emotions on the basis of their evolutionary past,
however the terms CARE and POWER/dominance are more con-
sistent with our concept of emotional operating systems reflecting
developmental and evolutionary origins.
Although some have argued that the concept of basic emo-
tions is not useful (e.g., Ortony and Turner, 1990), there are three
qualified advantages from our perspective. First we see the oper-
ating systems underlying certain key emotions playing a key role
in brain evolution and development (Affective Neural Selection),
a proposal which may generate future research on evolutionary
and developmental processes. Secondly, focusing attention on the
functions of these primordial systems in the evolutionary past
has led psychology to a greater awareness of the biological com-
plexities of human emotions. This promotes research on new
treatments and diagnostic techniques. For example the two sub-
types of depression and OCD that we have described suggest not
only different pharmaceutical treatments, but possible develop-
ment of differentiating diagnostic techniques based on CHR or
steroid levels, fMRI or genetic testing. Finally, along with the
concept of Affective Neural Selection, this modified concept of
primordial emotional systems may lead to new ideas on the pro-
motion of healthy emotional development in infancy, and perhaps
prenatal treatment of certain genetic variants.
Causal links are supported by the suggestions made through-
out this paper for psychiatric disorders associated with each of the
proposed primary emotional systems. Developing and validating
those proposals will be an important future step. Table 3 shows
our view on the current state of confirmation of the criteria C1–
C7. Elucidation of genetic links will be important in validating the
model, although this task is hampered by the polygenic nature of
the common heritable mental disorders and the relative rarity of
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each of a very large number of specific mutations contributing to
each disorder (Keller and Miller, 2006).
IMPLICATIONS
The nature of the phylogenetic influence on emotional behav-
ior has consequences in many areas of human life, e.g., eco-
nomics, politics, and education (Ellis, 2008). Given the assump-
tions of Affective Neural Selection, we have a more nuanced
version of motivational theory than simple conditioning the-
ory provides. Each major survival and reproductive need, we
propose, is related to one or more of the specific primary emo-
tional systems either directly, or indirectly through secondary
emotions; hence we can analyze psychological and psychiatric
issues in terms of their relation to these primary operating
systems in order to develop new forms of both therapy and
prevention.
FURTHER STEPS
The proposals here represent a small step toward developing the
psychological implications of Affective Neural Selection. Further
key steps include
1. Validating the list of primary phylogenetically influenced emo-
tional operating system (Tables 1 and 2) for correctness and
completeness. Is each case for inclusion adequate (cf. Table 3)?
The model can be supported or corrected by continuing
Table 2 |The proposed basic emotional systems together with their associated brain areas and key neuromodulators.
Evolutionary needs met Primary emotional system Putative neurochemicals Putative key components
of neural networks
INDIVIDUAL NEEDS
Basic functioning E1: SEEKING system (hedonic
appraisal, ”liking” component)
Endorphins (+), GABA (+, −)
enkephalins, DA (?)
endocannabinoids (+)
Nucleus accumbens, ventral pallidum, VTA,
brainstem nuclei
E1: SEEKING system (incentive
motivation “wanting” component)
DA (+), glutamate, Ach, CCK (+, −),
neurotensin, endorphins
Nucleus accumbens, ventral pallidum, lateral
hypothalamus, and VTA to PAG
Basic survival E2: DISGUST System (repulsion) Serotonin (+), substance P (+)?
Endocannabinoids (−)
Anterior insula, putamen, lower brainstem
(area postrema, NTS)
E3: RAGE System Substance P (+), Ach (+),
Glutamate (+), Vasopressin (+)
Medial amygdala, BNST, medial and
perifornical hypothalamus, dorsal PAG
E4: FEAR system Glutamate (+), DBI, CRH (+), CCK
(+),(α-MSH, NPY
Lateral and central amygdala, medial and
anterior hypothalamus to dorsal PAG and
pontine nuclei
SOCIAL NEEDS
Reproduction E5: LUST System Sexual desire Steroids (+), Vasopressin (+), LHRH
(+), DA (+)
Basal forebrain, amygdala, BNST, anterior
cingulate, medial preoptic, and VMH to
ventral PAG
Sexual satisfaction Opioids (+), Oxytocin (+) Septum, medial preoptic (VMH in ?), VTA
to PAG
Group cohesion:
bonding and
development
E6: NEED/ATTACHMENT
(separation distress)
Opioids (−, +), oxytocin (−, +),
prolactin (−/+), CRH
Anterior cingulate, BNST, POA, VTA, to PAG
E7: CARE/nurturance Oxytocin (+), prolactin (+),
dopamine, opioids (±) glutamate (+)
Anterior cingulate, BNST, preoptic
hypothalamus, to VTA and PAG
E8: PLAY System Opioids (+, −), DA (+) Ach (() Dorso-medial diencephalon (thalamic nuclei)
to ventral PAG
Group function:
regulating conflict
E9: POWER/dominance (rank,
status, submission)
Serotonin (±), DA (±) testosterone
(±) vasopressin (±) CCK. CRH (±)
Medial prefrontal cortex, ventral pallidum,
and other basal ganglia, hypothalamic nuclei
to PAG
The non-specific effects of serotonin and norepinephrine, are omitted, as are higher cortical areas. Based on Panksepp and Harro (2004), Watt (1999), Panksepp
and Harro (2004), Watt (1999) and sources referenced throughout the text. Key: CCK, cholecystokinin; CRH, corticotrophin releasing hormone; DA, dopamine; DBI,
diazepam binding inhibitor; LH-RH, leutenizing hormone releasing hormone; MSH, melanocyte stimulating hormone; NPY, neuropeptide Y; PAG, periaqueductal gray;
BNST, bed nucleus of the stria terminalis; NTS, nucleus tractus solitarius; POA, preoptic area; VMH, ventromedial hypothalamus; VTA, ventral tegmental area.
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Table 3 | Satisfaction of criteria C1–C7 for Basic Emotional Systems by the proposed primary emotional systems E1–E9, as we understand them
on the basis of data presently available.
Primary emotional system Criteria for basic system substantially satisfied?
[criteria numbered as in section 3]
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
E0/E1: Pleasure and SEEKING (satisfaction and incentive salience) Yes Yes Yes Partly Yes Yes Yes
E2: DISGUST system (repulsion) Yes Yes Partly Partly Yes Yes Yes
E3: RAGE system Yes Yes Yes Not yet Yes Yes Yes
E4: FEAR System Yes Yes Yes Partly Yes Yes Yes
E5: LUST system Yes Yes Yes Not yet Yes Yes Yes
E6: PANIC/attachment (affiliation, separation distress)‡ Yes Yes Yes Partly Yes Yes Yes
E7: CARE system Yes Yes Yes Not yet Yes Yes Yes
E8: PLAY system Yes Partly Partly Not yet Yes Yes Yes
E9: POWER/dominance system (rank, status, submission) Yes Partly Partly Partly Yes Yes Yes
The criteria are C1, Concept (seeTables 1–2); C2, Structure (neuroanatomy, seeTable 2); C3, Function (neurotransmitters, seeTable 2); C4, Development (genetics);
C5, Evolutionary Origin (seeTable 1); C6, Occurrence (homologs, see main text); C7, Outcome (psychiatric outcomes, see main text).
research on the links between the prototype states, neuroplas-
ticity molecules and genes (for example Kroes et al., 2006).
Our model also predicts that activation of different primary
systems (e.g., PANIC/attachment vs. POWER/subordination
in depressive patients) during ongoing evaluative tasks and
emotion regulation will be reflected in differential activity in
subcortical brain structures.
2. Using the resulting list of system to determine and
classify the nature of secondary emotions arising out
of these primary systems via the processes of Affec-
tive Neural Selection. Further research should be under-
taken to elucidate the influence of secondary emotions on
cognition.
3. Further elucidation of the effects of phylogenetically and onto-
logically primitive emotions on the cognitive development
of individuals. Our proposal is consistent with the notion
that even small alterations in prenatal environment due to
cytokines and transmitters may produce large changes in cog-
nitive development. Further research is necessary along these
lines.
These steps relate to the broader task of clarifying the issue
of psychological universals. Human commonalities and differences
develop in the context of societies that have universal functional
needs and physical environments with commonalities based on
universal underlying physical laws. In examining the function
of the human mind, the emotional systems must be taken in
conjunction on the one hand with the constellation of systems
for perception, pattern recognition, and memory, and on the
other the mechanisms of volition that balance rationality with
the unconscious, emotion, and value systems. Understanding these
interactions should lead to an enhanced understanding of the evo-
lutionary and developmental basis of emotional disorders (Price,
1967; Panksepp, 2002; Stevens and Price, 2002) taking cognizance
of neuroscience discoveries, current psychiatric knowledge, animal
behavior, and neurology.
Table 4 | Comparison of Hebbian and Skinnerian processes with
Affective Neural Selection.
Neural
Processes
Activity
dependent
neural
refinement
Response
to overall
affective
state
Further
genetically-
based value
system
dimensions
Overall
valence/
value
system
Hebbian
processes
Yes No No None
Skinnerian
conditioning
Yes Yes No One-
dimensional
Affective
neural
selection
Yes Yes Yes Nine-
dimensional
(seeTable 1)
The Overall Affective State (Column 3) provides a 1-dimensional assessment of
the organism’s state (positive or negative; pain or pleasure).The genetically-based
Value System Dimensions (Column 4) in the case of AND incorporate nuanced
survival information selected during evolutionary history and transmitted geneti-
cally. Thus these encode specific inbuilt behavior tendencies that are appropriate
in different circumstances and are available without prior learning. The Overall
Valence/Value System (Column 5) operating in the case of Affective Neural Selec-
tion incorporates emotional/affective evaluations, and so relates to the importance
of emotional systems in behavior, survival, and hence in evolution. These effects
are not present in the cases of either simple Hebbian processes or Skinnerian
conditioning.
Finally, the question arises as to what difference there is
between our proposal of Affective Neural Selection and the Heb-
bian processes of neural refinement on one hand and operant
conditioning on the other. A summary of the differences is
shown in Table 4. Note that Affective Neural Selection includes
Skinnerian conditioning as a special case; but flexible and
nuanced. It also works with Hebbian processes, but gives synaptic
refinement a valenced or value-based direction that pure Hebbian
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processes lack. The overall key issue is the usefulness of a multi-
dimensional affective assessment as proposed here, rather than
a one-dimensional system as given by operant conditioning. The
basic answer is that survival is enhanced in a complex environment
that has been already sampled numerous times during evolu-
tionary history, with the resultant lessons encapsulated in swift
emotional reactions to various survival problems (see Table 1).
These then shape development of ongoing brain functions during
the entire life span. In brief: it enables organisms to benefit directly
from the survival lessons experienced by evolutionary ancestors.
In this sense it can be conceptualized as a precursor of cultural
evolution. Detailed demonstration is now needed as to how this
leads to enhanced survival prospects in early life before much
learning has occurred.
Overall, our proposal is supported by a growing number of
studies emphasizing the role of emotions in the ontogeny and
phylogeny of human cognition. Greenspan and Shanker, 2004, p.
1) have thus aptly encapsulated our approach: “We have found that
the capacity to create symbols and to think stems from what was
often thought of by philosophers as the ‘enemy’ of reason and logic:
our passions and emotions . . . we will show how emotions actually
give birth to our very ability to create symbols and to think.”
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